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Zionism, Imperialism, and Indigeneity in Israel/Palestine: A Critical Analysis
Ran Ukashi

This discussion explores the similarities and differences between Zionism and
archetypical European modes of settler colonialism to demonstrate the incongruence between the
two phenomena. The analysis is contextualized around the recent discourse surrounding the
competing claims of indigeneity to historic Israel/Palestine. The claims of both the Jewish and
Palestinian Arab communities is explored to demonstrate that both communities can rightfully
claim degrees of Indigenous connection to the territory, but that Palestinian Arab claims of being
the sole Indigenous inheritors of the land are dubious. Furthermore, the relationship between
Ottoman and British imperialism in the development of both nationalisms is expounded to
illustrate the contributory factors of imperial policies and the development of the national
aspirations of both social groups. The analysis will draw upon the theoretical works of peace and
conflict studies (PACS) scholars Louis Kriesberg, John Burton, and others to illustrate the
applicability of identity-based conflict analysis and unmet human needs theory to provide a
novel demonstration that attempts to de-indigenize the Jewish People from their connection to
the land will only serve to exacerbate the ongoing Israeli-Palestinian conflict.
The issue dealt with in this paper is subject to a wide range of perspectives and debate.
The literature on the Israeli-Palestinian conflict is myriad, and it spans over 100 years of research
and discursive engagement. While the thesis of my argument is clear from the outset, the
ultimate purpose of engaging in this endeavour is to contribute a reconsideration of Zionism as
an Indigenous emancipation movement within the sphere of Peace and Conflict Studies in
general, and within its postcolonial subdiscipline, in particular. I aim to highlight the need for
PACS practitioners to integrate this approach to Zionism into the prevailing analysis of conflict
and praxis, so that the phenomenon can be properly understood in an Indigenous theoretical
context that is largely missing from the current debate on Zionism, the Israeli-Palestinian conflict,
and by extension, any formative solutions or conflict management strategies that may emerge
thereby. As such, this paper aims to be a prelude to further studies on the subject.
On July 25, 2016, Palestinian Foreign Minister Riyad al-Maliki delivered a statement on
behalf of Palestinian President Mahmoud Abbas, threatening to sue the British government over
the issuing of the 1917 Balfour Declaration (Hazan, 2017, para. 1). The charge was: that the

British were complicit in the “historic crime” of the establishment of a Jewish homeland in
Palestine—at the expense of the “Indigenous” Arabs who “…had lived for thousands of years on
the soil of their homeland” (Dearden, 2016, para. 1)—for the benefit of ostensibly foreign Jews.
As a form of redress for the Declaration, the Palestinian Authority (PA) has requested,
among other things, that the United Kingdom take particular steps to make amends for this
alleged injustice, “…including apologizing to the Palestinian people; recognizing the Palestinian
state without delay; revoking the Balfour Declaration and issuing a new declaration in its stead
that does justice with the Palestinians, and compensating the Palestinians for the suffering caused
by the declaration” (Hazan, 2017, para. 2). Thus, it is by appealing to indigeneity that the
Palestinians take issue with the notion of the legitimacy of a separate Indigenous claim to the
territory, as Abbas’ statement reiterated:
On the basis of this terrible declaration – [in which] those who did not own [the land]
promised it to those who were not entitled [to it] – hundreds of thousands of Jews from
Europe and elsewhere were brought [to Palestine] at the expense of our Palestinian
people who had been living… in their homeland for millennia…Yes, a century has
passed since the terrible Balfour Declaration, in which Britain unjustly gave the land of
Palestine to another people, thereby paving the way for the Nakba [of Palestinian people]
and their dispossession and displacement from their land. (Hazan, 2017, para. 2)
It becomes evident that this rationale for rejecting the Balfour Declaration in its
centennial year is based on a two-pronged set of assumptions—first, that the Palestinian Arabs
are the sole legitimate heirs to the territory of historic Palestine, built on the claim of possessing
unparalleled indigeneity to the territory as a social group; and second, that Jewish settlement in
Palestine always was, and always will be, a British-imperialist-facilitated settler colonial
enterprise. This logic requires the “de-indigenization” of the Jewish People from the territory of
Palestine, and a supplanting of that indigeneity with that of the Palestinian Arabs alone.
In light of these claims, it becomes necessary to determine their veracity, and the
obstacles such attitudes pose towards seeking mutual peace and justice for Israelis and
Palestinians. As such, while a comprehensive review of the Zionist-Palestinian Arab conflict is
beyond our scope, our discussion explores the imperialist and colonialist context of Palestine,
including Zionist settlement and Arab migration to Palestine beginning in the Ottoman Period of
the 1880s, until the period prior to the 1947 partition of Palestine under the British Mandate.
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Additionally, the notions of both Jewish and Palestinian Arab indigeneity are explored to
ascertain whether the Zionist enterprise can be viewed as an archetypical settler colonial project
of a foreign group exploitatively settling on the land of an Indigenous community. This is critical,
since the basis of Palestinian rejectionism toward the Balfour Declaration stems directly from the
claim of sole indigeneity to the land. Furthermore, the analysis will utilize Kriesberg’s (2003b)
approach to examining the nature of conflicts and their relative intractability, as well as Burton’s
(1998) and Marker’s (2003) discussion of unmet human needs to demonstrate that the denial of
Jewish indigeneity in the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict contributes to its persistence
over time. Accordingly, the discussion explores these matters and their consequences.
The 1917 Balfour Declaration
Following the defeat of Ottoman forces, Britain came into possession of Palestine, which
was of strategic importance for several reasons. First, it acted as a topographical buffer to the
east (Matthew, 2013) to protect the Suez Canal in Egypt from imperial rivals in the region
(Cohen, 2010), who also coveted the territory for similar reasons (Golan, 2001). Particularly for
Britain, Palestine facilitated a land-based transit route from Iraqi oil fields to the Mediterranean
(Cohen, 2010), and it provided a critical sea-route (and prospective railway) to both the Persian
Gulf and Britain’s most prized colonial possession: India (Matthew, 2013).
In 1917, to solidify its domestic support, Britain sought to ingratiate itself to the local
population of Jews and Palestinian Arabs out of the mistaken belief that the empire could
manipulate their respective nationalist aspirations toward imperial military and economic ends
(Renton, 2013). The British did not seriously entertain the desires of either community, and
filtered much of their approach through a Eurocentric lens—dismissing Palestinian Arab
nationalism, in particular, to a perceived “backwardness,” while also being suspicious of their
loyalties to rival powers, especially France, which controlled the countries of Syria and Lebanon,
as a result of the Sykes-Picot Agreement (to be discussed below) (Golan, 2001).
This undoubtedly contributed to the subsequent dismissal of Palestinian Arab protests
over British support for Zionism—the threat of which was viewed as immaterial (Cohen,
2010)—and due to the presumption that the Zionists, a majority of whom were of European
extraction, would be more loyal and “civilized” by comparison, to the British cause (Matthew,
2013). This attitude was one that many Zionists strategically exploited (Matthew, 2013), which
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has led to a misdiagnosis of Zionism by some analysts as a form of colonialism born out of
British collusion (Golan, 2001), to be discussed in greater detail below.
While the attitudes held by British imperial authorities toward both Zionism and
Palestinian Arab nationalism waxed and waned during the Mandate period, the resultant
consequence of British imperialism, then, was an over-promising of independence to Arab and
Jewish nationalists who sought that independence in the same piece of territory (Renton, 2013).
For instance, through the 1915-1916 McMahon-Husein Correspondence between Henry
McMahon, the British High Commissioner of Egypt and Sherif of Mecca and Emir of the Hijaz,
Sherif Husein, Britain promised Husein dominion over all Arab territories of the soon-to-be
former Ottoman Empire, with the exceptions of the lands that would become Iraq and Lebanon.
As a result of this agreement, Husein rallied support in Yemen and Syria against Ottoman forces
on behalf of the British led by Colonel T.E. Lawrence (Andersen, Seibert, & Wagner, 2001).
Husein, however, was not the only proverbial “game in town,” and in 1916, the British
concurrently negotiated with the French to divide the Ottoman Empire. Syria and Lebanon were
allocated to French tutelage, and Britain was assigned Iraq and Palestine, and the Arabian
peninsula, via the 1916 Sykes-Picot Agreement (Goff, Moss, Terry, & Upshur, 1998). This
solidified French and British domains of control (Andersen, et al., 2001), and thereby clearly
overlapped the territories promised in the Husein-McMahon Correspondence—demonstrating,
yet again, that Britain did not intend to relinquish its imperial influence in the Middle East in the
near future.
Then, there was the Balfour Declaration of November 1917, in which Lord Arthur James
Balfour, the British Foreign Secretary, wrote to the prominent British Zionist, Lord Walter
Rothschild, declaring the British government’s “…sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations”
(Balfour, 1917), and most significantly that:
His Majesty’s Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national
home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavors to facilitate the
achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which
may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in
Palestine or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.
(Balfour, 1917, para. 5)
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The Declaration’s commitments were edified in the text of the British Palestine Mandate
on July 24, 1922, whereby recognition was given “…to the historical connection of the Jewish
people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country”
(The Palestine Mandate, 1922, para. 3). The Balfour Declaration was based on an implicit
acceptance and widespread acknowledgement of the longstanding Jewish connection to the land,
and it supported the goal of “reconstituting” the Jewish People in the land, and to one extent or
another recognized a pre-existing Indigenous connection validated by history. Importantly, the
Declaration appeared to recognize the Jews as a distinct nation, akin to other nations throughout
the world (Troen, 2007).
However, a close reading of the Declaration demonstrates that Britain was deliberately
vague in its support of Jewish self-determination in Palestine, characterizing support for a
“national home,” while avoiding terms of statehood or any clear geographical boundaries.
Moreover, it recognized that any consequent undertaking was not to prejudice non-Jewish—
including, and especially, Arab—communities.
Nevertheless, the contradictions within these documents were readily apparent, but were
of no consequence to imperial powers who had no interest in tempering their ambitions. At the
1919 Paris Peace Conference, European interests in the Middle East, with American approval,
were to continue on the condition that the imperial powers recognize the League of Nations. The
terms of the agreement emerged out of the 1920 San Remo Conference where the League of
Nations “mandate system” was born, allocating Iraq, Palestine, and Transjordan to Britain, and
Syria and Lebanon to the French (Goff et al., 1998)—similar to the terms within the Sykes-Picot
Agreement.
Given an understanding of the competing nationalisms in Palestine, and the imperial
“lines in the sand” drawn up at the Paris Peace Conference, Renton (2013) argued that the
primary reason the British government supported Zionism, through the Balfour Declaration, was
to secure alleged “Jewish power” in the United States and Europe. It was believed that Jewish
capital and influence would aid Britain in its rivalry with the Central Powers and elsewhere
(Renton, 2013), the substance of which was more myth than reality (Bauer, 1979). Overall,
Britain could not afford to continue its imperial largesse following the events of World War I,
which made the prospect of Zionist-provided capital investment in Palestine particularly
attractive (Cohen, 2011). As Cohen elaborated:
5

Palestine was basically a poor country, lacking growth potential. Apart from a limited
reserve of minerals in the Dead Sea, it had no known natural resources, no significant
agricultural potential or local consumers’ market, and no obvious outlet for British
investment…Britain’s primary interest in Palestine was strategic. But thanks to Zionists,
it came into a unique windfall – significant imports of Jewish capital, donations to the
Jewish National Home. During the entire period of the Mandate, the Palestine
administration’s entire budget never reached the level of Jewish capital imports.
(Cohen, 2011, p. 116; italic emphasis added)
Politically, such Zionist capital was quite opportune for British domestic consumption,
given that Britain was committed to ensuring taxpayers did not have to prop up Palestine
economically. The infusion of significant Jewish capital into Palestine allowed for British
interests to maintain their presence while bearing minimal costs. Regarding this consensus at the
time, Cohen cogently illustrated that,
By 1923, no official disputed the fact that without the continued import of Jewish capital
and enterprise into Palestine, not only would the pace of development in the country slow
down drastically, or even come to a halt, but also any expenses incurred in its routine
administration would fall on the British taxpayer. Such a prospect was pure anathema to
all postwar British governments. (Cohen, 2010, p. 89)
In other words, Zionist investment could offset the costs of Britain’s imperial dominion,
in exchange for at least a “promise” of Jewish self-determination in Palestine (Cohen, 2010), and
it would provide the necessary capital to develop Palestine as a whole (not just for the benefit of
the Zionists) (Cohen, 2010), which had been left underdeveloped (and subsequently underpopulated) (Cohen, 2011) following centuries of Ottoman imperial dominion. Moreover, the
British recognized that Zionists would be willing to invest even at a loss, as the motive for such
investment was not profit-oriented—an attractive prospect that was not lost on Zionist efforts to
sway British authorities towards supporting Zionism (Cohen, 2011). However, at least by the
1920s there appears to have been some genuine desire (and moralistic considerations) to appear
honorable to commitments made to the Jews in terms of supporting a Jewish national home, in
exchange for financing British imperial projects in Palestine (Matthew, 2013), especially as no
other sources of investment were likely.
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Much more can be said, and much ink has been spilled discussing the Balfour
Declaration over the past 100 years since its existence. While the history surrounding the Balfour
Declaration is clear, including its most positive—and most tragic—consequences, I shall turn my
attention to the second part of this article, exploring the relational “indigeneities” of Jews and
Palestinian Arabs to the land, and providing a critical appraisal of Palestinian Arab claims
negating, or diminishing Jewish indigeneity to the land.
The Erasure of Memory: Denying Jewish Indigeneity
At its most basic, an “Indigenous people,” is one that has inhabited a given territory prior
to any contact with foreign settlers or colonizers with a different way of life (Yahel, Kark, &
Frantzman, 2012). According to the United Nations Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues
(UNPFII), a loose set of criteria are provided that apply to a diverse set of Indigenous peoples, in
an equally diverse set of contexts, of which some—but not necessarily all—of the following
criteria must be met:
Self-identification as [I]ndigenous [P]eoples at the individual level and accepted by the
community as their member; Historical continuity with pre-colonial and/or pre-settler
societies; Strong link to territories and surrounding natural resources; Distinct social,
economic or political systems; Distinct language, culture and beliefs; Form non-dominant
groups of society; Resolve to maintain and reproduce their ancestral environments and
systems as distinctive peoples and communities. (United Nations, n.d., para. 3)
Naturally, this definition makes no judgment on the existence of a multiplicity of
Indigenous peoples within a given space; it merely demonstrates the generally agreed-upon
criteria that pertains to Indigenous Peoples across the world. It is apparent then that many
Palestinian Arabs consider this definition to apply to themselves, but deny its reciprocal
application to the Jews, ergo invalidating any claims to Jewish self-determination.
However, official Palestinian Authority media frequently denies Jewish indigeneity in the
territory of historic Eretz Yisrael (Land of Israel)/Palestine. Such pronouncements are
mainstream within Palestinian political discourse. For instance, on May 14, 2011, Abdallah AlIfranji, an advisor to Palestinian president Mahmoud Abbas, relayed words on behalf of the
President, where he remarked:
National reconciliation [between Hamas and Fatah] is required in order to face Israel and
Netanyahu. We say to him [Netanyahu], when he claims – that they [Jews] have a
7

historical right dating back to 3,000 years BCE – we say that the nation of Palestine upon
the land of Canaan had a 7,000-year history BCE. This is the truth, which must be
understood and we have to note it, in order to say: “Netanyahu, you are incidental in
history. We are the people of history. We are the owners of history.” (Palestinian Media
Watch, 2011, para. 2)
To buttress such arguments, Palestinian Arabs must expound genealogical claims to
Peoples who predate the Jewish presence in the land. The premise of such assertions—albeit
with little evidence (Bukay, 2012)—involves, for instance, a claim of descent to the Jebusites of
ancient Canaan, the original inhabitants of Jerusalem according to the Old Testament, in an effort
to invalidate later Jewish claims to the city (Wenkel, 2007). In other cases, Palestinians have
orchestrated ritual observances to the ancient god, Baal, as a purported demonstration of their
Canaanite heritage (Breger, 1997).
By denying Jewish indigeneity and inventing a supersessionist Palestinian Arab
indigeneity, the Palestinian political narrative has engaged in a form of cultural appropriation as
a tool by which to delegitimize the Zionist enterprise in its totality, and sever Jewish connection
to the land (Bukay, 2012). As Bukay asserted, “[t]his fictitious history, which ignores all
historical documentation and established historical methods, is based on systematic distortions of
both ancient and modern history with the aim of denying Israel’s right to exist” (p. 23).
Without prejudicing any claims of some Palestinian Arabs on the subject of indigeneity,
Jewish attachment to the land predates any documented Arab presence by millennia. In fact, and
again, without prejudicing any justifiable Palestinian claims to national sovereignty or
indigeneity of their own, as Yahel et al. (2012) reminded, “Jews are the only nation that can
claim an uninterrupted presence on the land from biblical times to date—for a significant amount
of the time as its rulers” (p. 8). By extension of this fact, the Jews have ties to the land prior to
the emergence of any imperial powers in the modern era:
The Land of Israel has a dual history, marked both by constant waves of immigration and
invasion by various peoples and uninterrupted Jewish presence in the land from time
immemorial. The Jews have always considered the Land of Israel their national homeland,
have lived in it as a sovereign nation in historical times, maintained at least a toehold
there despite persecution, and returned to it time and again after being exiled. This
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spiritual relationship is also expressed in both Jewish daily prayers and Israel’s
Declaration of Independence. (Yahel et al., 2012, p. 14)
Of note, some Arab groups may have migrated to, and settled in, the land following the
return of Jews from exile in 538 B.C.E. It is well known that beginning in the seventh century,
with the expansion of various Islamic empires into the Levant, including Palestine, came a
variety of ethnic groups, including Arabs, but all under the aegis of Islamic imperial rule from
that point forward until the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire (Yahel et al., 2012). This history
could reasonably provide descendants of those Arabs with sufficient claims to national rights—
including Indigenous rights—but not at the expense of the Jewish rights to the same. At issue is
not the supplanting of the rights of one party over the other—there can be more than one
Indigenous population within a given territory—but rather the denial of Jewish indigeneity
altogether. Nor does such an acknowledgment privilege one group to have dominion over
another—an important, but altogether separate discussion.
Acknowledging this history, one would have to take great pains to divest the Jewish
People from their rightful Indigenous heritage in the land. To do so would demand a loosening of
the threshold required to make a reasonable claim to indigeneity, which would actually serve to
strengthen the Jewish claim versus its competitors (albeit, without prejudicing those claims that
could meet the threshold) (Yahel et al., 2012). Thus, the view of the Jewish People as a distinct
nation bound to the land of Eretz YisraelPalestine, both physically and spiritually, is a wellestablished, millennia-old trait.
Important, however, is the fact that such rhetorical distortions serve to exacerbate the
current intractability of the conflict between Israelis and Palestinians. According to Kriesberg
(2003b), the intractability, or persistence of a social conflict is influenced by various factors,
including the belief or perception that the goals of one group (i.e., Zionism) contradicts the goals
of another (i.e., Palestinian Arab nationalism). Such conflicts are typified by persistently
destructive relationships despite efforts to positively transform them by members of both sides of
the conflict, as well as third party mediators. Moreover, while not always the case, it is common
for intractable conflicts to be inherited and perpetuated intergenerationally, which tends to
further ossify the conflict and make it more difficult to de-escalate so as to pursue some form of
mutually acceptable peaceful outcome.
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Accordingly, the reason such conflicts tend to be intractable is precisely because they
centre around issues of identity—involving both the perceptions social groups in conflict have of
themselves and their real, or perceived, enemies. This perception informs how they relate to each
other, how they believe the conflict should be resolved, and how best to achieve that end. In
essence, such conflicts are more typically zero-sum than conflicts over mere material concerns in
that the idea of compromise is often seen as a price that is too high to pay and comes at the
expense of a core element of group identity—often to the point of feeling that the existence of
one’s group identity hinges on the collective ability to resist compromise. As Kriesberg wrote:
Members of one or more sides in every conflict have grievances, some of which
contribute to intractability. This is the case when members of one side feel grossly
wronged by the oppression and injustices imposed by the other side, or feel that their very
existence is threatened. Such feelings tend to be found in conflicts that are intractable.
(Kriesberg, 2003b, para. 15)
In fact, Burton (1998) went so far as to suggest that such critical identity-related issues
are not subject to bargaining or compromise along the lines that more material matters are, as
there is an implicit “need” to have one’s identity recognized and legitimated. While many
scholars are critical of this approach as being too deterministic and opaque (Rubenstein, 2001;
Marker, 2003), there is certainly some merit in recognizing that unmet needs can—albeit
contextually—count as an independent variable worthy of consideration when analyzing
conflicts (Rubenstein, 2001). Thus, feelings of existential threat can lead to intractability or
emerge as the result of intractability. Either way, such intractability produces dichotomous “usversus-them” thinking that is characteristic of identity-based conflicts (Kriesberg, 2003a).
For our purposes, social identity is understood to be socially constructed insofar as there
has historically been mobility between various elements of identity, including religious, ethnic,
racial, and other considerations depending on the context—although some elements of ethnicity
are more malleable than others (Kriesberg, 2003a). Identity-based conflicts, especially ethnicoriented conflicts such as the Israeli-Palestinian conflict result in competitive thinking, in which
social groups broadly share similar values, beliefs, and aspirations that seemingly—or
realistically—contradict those shared by a competing social group. While intractability is not
necessarily a permanent condition, it is unlikely to be alleviated unless some form of mutually
beneficial congruence is established between the competing social groups in question.
10

It should be noted that possessing a set of identities is natural and necessary, and is not a
problem in and of itself; rather the denial of a particularly salient element of a collective group’s
identity is likely to result in social conflict that will almost certainly be intractable until
recognition of that element of identity is respected. That is, there needs to be a legitimation of
one’s identity vis-à-vis an adversarial social group that can lead to a positive-sum set of social
relations that hitherto is impossible to achieve (Marker, 2003). As Marker poignantly illustrated
regarding the Israeli-Palestinian conflict itself:
For example, the Palestinian conflict involves the unmet needs of identity and security.
Countless Palestinians feel that their legitimate identity is being denied them, both
personally and nationally. Numerous Israelis feel that they have no security individually
because of suicide bombings, nationally because their state is not recognized by many of
their close neighbors, and culturally because anti-Semitism is growing worldwide. Israeli
and Palestinian unmet needs directly and deeply affect all the other issues associated with
this conflict. Consequently, if a resolution is to be found, the needs of Palestinian identity
and Israeli security must be addressed and satisfied on all levels. (Marker, 2003, para. 4)
As such, for there to be a realistic chance for the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to end, there
must be a mutual recognition that both Jews and Palestinian Arabs have national rights, in order
to transform how each community perceives the other, and to build the requisite trust necessary
to create peace on the ground. In fact, such mutual recognition is critical in ensuring that positive
relationships based on trust can arise between both Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs, in order to
begin the process of reconciliation in some form (Kriesberg, 2003a). While this certainly
includes an acceptance of Palestinian identity and rights, it also includes a priori a recognition of
Jewish indigeneity—as a core and inalienable element of Jewish peoplehood and identity—to the
same territory that Palestinians claim as a homeland.
It should be noted that the recognition of Jewish indigeneity in Eretz Yisrael/Palestine
does not preclude any agreement which would result in national self-determination for both Jews
and Palestinian Arabs in the land, but rather to demonstrate that merely claiming that Jews are
not Indigenous to the territory further exacerbates the conflict. The same can be said for those
claiming Palestinian Arabs have no rights to self-determination. The discussion here does not
surround what a policy outcome would look like but deals only with official Palestinian
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governmental denial of Jewish indigeneity as a contributing factor to the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict.
Given an understanding of what drives identity-based conflicts, such as the IsraeliPalestinian conflict, it is necessary to turn attention to an exploration of Zionism and Palestinian
Arab nationalism in historical context. In doing so, I preface the subsequent discussion of
postcolonialist critiques of Zionism, which mirror those levied by official Palestinian Authority
political communications, and develop an understanding of how Zionism differs significantly
from archetypical settler colonial societies around the world.
Zionism, Migration, and Palestinian Arab Nationalism
Prior to the emergence of nationalism within the Ottoman Empire in the late 19th and
early 20th centuries, Islam was the most dominant organizing societal principle in the ArabIslamic world. Palestinian Arab identity was centered around a “…complex web of political and
social allegiances: Ottoman, Arab, Greater Syrian, regional, religious, and familial” (Renton,
2013, p. 577). Thus, Palestinian Arab notions of national uniqueness is considerably more recent
than Jewish notions in the land (Joffe, 2012), and was somewhat ironically influenced by the
nascent and growing Zionist movement emerging in Palestine (Bukay, 2012).
Moreover, many of the Arab inhabitants in Palestine in the period immediately following
the First World War were recent migrants to the territory, and were—again, not without irony—
spurred to migrate by the fruits of Jewish immigration (Karsh, 2008). In fact, it is noteworthy to
mention that the Zionist enterprise—through its economic investment in Palestine—not only
increased Arab immigration, but decreased the prior trend of Arab emigration from Palestine, as
Karsh illustrated:
[…] the inflow of Jewish immigrants and capital after World War I revived the country’s
hitherto static population. If prior to the war some 2,500-3,000 Arabs, or one out of every
200-250 inhabitants, emigrated from Palestine every year, this rate was slashed to about
800 per annum between 1920 and 1936, while the Arab population rose from about
600,000 to some 950,000 owing to the substantial improvement in the socio-economic
conditions attending the development of the Jewish National Home. (Karsh, 2008, p. 364)
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The 1937 Report of the Palestine Royal Commission acknowledged this economic-related
growth in the Arab population, where it stated:
The Arab population shows a remarkable increase since 1920, and it has had some share
in the increased prosperity of Palestine. Many Arab landowners have benefited from the
sale of land and the profitable investment of the purchase money. The fellaheen are better
off, on the whole, than they were in 1920. This Arab progress has been partly due to the
import of Jewish capital into Palestine and other factors associated with the growth of the
National Home. In particular, the Arabs have benefited from social services, which could
not have been provided on the existing scale without the revenue obtained from the Jews.
(Great Britain, Peel, W.R.W.P, 1937, para. 18)
It is of interest to learn there was a concomitantly negative relationship between
Palestinian Arab material gain, and the resultant affinity for their Jewish co-habitants, as the Peel
Commission illustrated:
We have found that, though the Arabs have benefited by the development of the country
owing to Jewish immigration, this has had no conciliatory effect. On the contrary,
improvement in the economic situation in Palestine has meant the deterioration of the
political situation. (Peel Commission, 1937, p. 363)
Again, while making exception for those Arabized Peoples that could justifiably claim
lineage directly to antiquity, it can be demonstrated that of the significant cohort of Arab
economic migrants to Palestine from modern-day Egypt, Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, and elsewhere
(Bukay, 2012) prior to partition in 1947, no reasonably Indigenous connection to the territory can
be claimed.
Critics counter this reality with the charge that most Jewish settlers in Palestine also
arrived in the three decades or so prior to the establishment of the State of Israel (Greenstein,
2017), which could therefore provide an argument that the case between recent Jewish and Arab
arrivals to Palestine are equivalent in this regard. However, this critique ignores the motivations
of this migration, with the former being motivated largely by an existing Indigenous connection
to the land, and the latter being motivated by more material concerns. Thus, the definition of
Indigenous connection, supplemented by the criteria set out by UNPFII, demonstrates the
Indigenous connections of the Jews to the land, which does not apply to the more recent Arab
migrants to Palestine. That is not to say that those Arab economic migrants had no right to reside
13

in the land; only that they cannot reasonably claim Indigenous heritage, and if the argument is
made that they can indeed make such claims regardless of definitional restrictions, then by the
same token, so too can the Jewish People.
Postcolonialism and Its Discontents
Thus far, it can be established that a rejection of Jewish indigeneity to the land requires
the employment of fallacious history with the rhetoric of decolonization. This involves the use of
politicized communications to link the phenomenon of Zionism with historical European settler
colonialism through a post-colonialist and postmodernist lens (Bukay, 2012). This is achieved
through the reductive ascription of complex social ills to the legacies of imperialism and
colonialism (Salzman, 2007), working retroactively to illustrate a predetermined causal linkage.
Therefore, without focusing on the positive or negative consequences of history, the question
becomes whether Zionism is a form of Indigenous self-determination for the Jewish People, or
an illegitimate settler colonial project involving the disenfranchising of an Indigenous population
for the benefit of an alien population.
Given the ideological diversity within “Zionism” (Jewish Virtual Library, n.d.a) at its
most basic, a distilled definition of Zionism involves the commitment to the (re)establishment of
a Jewish national home in the Jewish People’s historic homeland (Eretz Yisrael/Palestine) in one
fashion or another (Jewish Virtual Library, n.d.b). The different ideas surrounding how this type
of national polity should emerge is beyond the scope of our discussion, but essentially it was an
emancipation movement emerging out of the European nationalistic milieu of the late 19th
century (Bareli, 2001), aiming to assert Jewish sovereignty and the creation of a Jewish body
politic in at least part of the ancient lands of Israel.
However, critics of Zionism consider it to be nothing more than a form of Britishfacilitated colonial exploitation and dispossession by foreigners to the land, in order to establish
a polity that asserts its dominance over an Indigenous population (Bareli, 2001). Viewed as such,
Zionism, then, is inherently illegitimate. However, as such critics are largely informed by settler
colonial theories, a historically contextualized response is required to separate fact from fiction
with “…neither moral judgmentalism nor apologetics on behalf of Israeli interests” (Bareli, 2001,
p. 103), or presumably for that matter, Palestinian Arab interests.
What then, is “settler colonialism?” Greenstein provided a comprehensive definition,
which is instructive:
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[Settler colonialism] identifies a cluster of societies in which colonial rule – the overseas
extension of Europe-based states – was combined with large-scale immigration of
metropolitan settlers. Politically, it focuses on particularly resilient forms of domination
that serve the interests of settlers who made a new home for themselves in overseas
territories. Facing resistance from indigenous people to their subjugation, settler societies
were shaped historically by ongoing conflict. This has provided them with common
features and a sense of shared destiny, based on the similar challenges they faced.
Solidarity between those at the losing end – indigenous groups, slaves and other people
marginalized through this form of colonial rule – is the other part of the process.
(Greenstein, 2017, p. 1)
Thus, one can see that settler colonialism as a phenomenon is quite malleable, and
applicable to many scenarios and can take on many forms (Greenstein, 2017). However, the one
thing that all cases of settler colonialism have in common is, according to Greenstein, “the
distinction between indigenous people and settlers (including their descendants)” (p. 3).
Greenstein argued that while Jews can certainly, to an extent, be viewed as Indigenous to
the territory, as “…if not as individuals then as a collective – The Jewish People – that
maintained unique identity and link to the country over millennia, regardless of specific time and
space configurations” (Greenstein, 2017, p. 3). However, he seemingly qualified Jewish
indigeneity to those residing within Palestine prior to Zionist (re)colonization. Speaking with
regard to the consequences of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War following partition, Greenstein wrote:
It involved the displacement of indigenous people by recently-arrived settler immigrants:
a vast majority of local Jews by 1948 had moved to Palestine in the previous three
decades, and new immigrants from Eastern Europe and the Middle East doubled their
numbers within the next four years. In the other cases [wars between equally indigenous
parties to a conflict] those involved were equally indigenous to the scene as they had
co-existed in the same territory for centuries. (Greenstein, 2017, p. 10)
That is, Greenstein appeared to dismiss the notion that those Jews who immigrated in the
recent decades prior to the 1947 partition of Palestine could claim indigeneity to the land, and
seems to privilege Arab indigeneity by virtue of longstanding residence, while failing to apply
the same standard to those Arabs who recently migrated to Palestine as well. Thus, for this
critique to sustain itself, it is essential for Jewish notions of indigeneity to be dismissed or
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minimized, insofar as an indeterminate number of Jews in Palestine prior to partition had not
lived among the Arab population “for centuries.”
This perspective privileges longstanding association with a land—as is undoubtedly the
case with many Palestinian Arabs—over the Jewish Indigenous connection, without identifying a
reason, nor a threshold for these criteria. This therefore problematizes Greenstein’s approach, as
no time threshold is established to constitute a “legitimate” length of time by which to claim
indigeneity, or have indigeneity extinguish. Moreover, this application of indigeneity is
arbitrarily applied to only one set of Jews within a specific set of criteria, while not applying to
the collective Jewish People, as per the commonly accepted application of the concept elucidated
via UNPFII.
Other critiques focus on different elements of the Zionist enterprise. According to Wolfe
(2006), both settler colonialism and genocide are linked in a “logic of elimination,” whereby
genocide can be—but is not necessarily—a component of settler colonial processes. In other
words, settler colonialism seeks an “elimination” of sorts, but is not invariably genocidal in its
outcome (Wolfe, 2006). The primary motive of settler populations is to gain access to territory
by eliminating native societies, either physically, or culturally through assimilation, and supplant
it with a foreign society, a process which can take many forms (Wolfe, 2006).
Wolfe applied this concept to Zionist colonization in Palestine, claiming that the process
of colonization involved efforts to disenfranchise not only Palestinian Arab labour, but also to
fashion an exclusively Jewish state, from “…the negative process of excluding Palestine’s
Indigenous owners” (Wolfe, 2006, p. 390). Implicit, of course, is the suggestion that Jews—
Zionist or not—are not Indigenous to the territory. Wolfe stated his contention bluntly, and
applied to Israel (even defined by pre-1967 borders) the same condition he applied to all settler
colonial societies that:
[…] settler colonialism is an inclusive, land-centred project that coordinates a
comprehensive range of agencies, from the metropolitan centre to the frontier
encampment, with a view of eliminating Indigenous societies. Its operations are not
dependent on the presence or absence of formal state institutions or functionaries.
(Wolfe, 2006, p. 393)
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Yet in his conflation of Israel’s founding with settler colonialism, Wolfe engaged in
emotive polemics describing Israel’s “…chronic addiction to territorial expansion” (Wolfe, 2006,
p. 401) and implicitly denied Jewish indigeneity to the territory by suggesting that the Zionist
enterprise had driven “…so many of its original inhabitants into the sand” (p. 401). Of
importance here is that aside from a critique of particular Israeli policies—which may or may not
be legitimate—the denial of Jewish indigeneity is taken for granted, which then paves the way
for a simplistic and erroneous equation between Zionism and settler colonialism.
Lloyd goes further by considering Zionism to be an “…exemplary settler colonial
project” (Lloyd, 2012, p. 59), arguing that Zionism necessitated—and continues to necessitate—
the “functional absence” of “native people” in Palestine (p. 61), effectively downplaying Jewish
indigeneity to the land, and privileging Palestinian Arab indigeneity. Furthermore, Lloyd cited
the existence of Zionist Eurocentricism and desires among them to emulate European nationstates, which will be addressed in more detail below, as evidence of Zionist imperialism, and as a
typical manifestation of settler colonies around the world. Lloyd stated:
Accordingly, the foundations of Zionism are imbued with the contradictory pulls of
European nationalisms in general, between an inwardly directed demand for selfdetermination and an outwardly directed desire for expansion through the colonisation of
others considered inferior to Europeans...insisting on the equivalence of the European
Jews to other European nationalities and therefore on the right to self-determination while
at the same time negotiating with the German Kaiser, British Colonial Secretary Joseph
Chamberlain, and the Ottoman Sultan in turn for a land to colonise, embodies the terms
that would come to shape Zionism through and through. Zionism’s conception of a
nationality lay in the ethnic but largely secular nationalisms of Europe. Like its
nineteenth-century European forebears, Zionist nationalism was founded in the belief in
the historical destiny of a given people to self-determination and sovereignty. (Lloyd,
2012, pp. 63-64)
Thus, Lloyd equated Zionism with European settler colonialism by virtue of the existence
of similar worldviews between some Zionists and Western European nations. Importantly, Lloyd
suggested that Zionist settler colonialism is characterized, as all settler colonialism is, on the
appropriation of Indigenous land, “...rather than the political and economic subordination of the

17

Indigenous population, the monopolisation of its resources, or the control of its markets” (Lloyd,
2012, p. 66).
However, as Penslar (2001) lucidly illustrated, this characterization requires the
obfuscation of the underlying motivations behind Zionism as an Indigenous revival of the Jewish
People in their historic homeland:
Zionism was a product of the age of imperialism; its adherents shared a number of
common sensibilities with European advocates of colonial expansion in the Middle East.
Yet the movement was not, in and of itself, a form of colonial practice. Due to myriad
historical and ideological factors, Zionism sought to realize itself in the Middle East, in
an area chosen not for its strategic value, natural resources or productive capabilities, but
solely because of the Jews’ historic, religious and cultural ties to the area known to them
as the Land of Israel. (Penslar, 2001, p. 96)
As can be deduced, many settler colonial models apply malleable criteria to
accommodate a critique of Zionism. Shimoni argued that postcolonialist theory is often used as a
tool through which to weaponize critique, by associating anything with “colonialism”—rightly or
wrongly, and often without sufficient critical inquiry—to be beyond the pale (Shimoni, 2007).
Steinberg suggested that such lenses utilize selective bias to determine a priori “oppressors” and
“oppressed” groups, and allow for ideological positions to disproportionately value subjective
interpretations of events in order to produce notionally valid results (Steinberg, 2007).
Given our discussion of Jewish indigeneity and its subsequent rejection by many
Palestinian Arabs, as well as a discussion of postcolonialist attempts to correlate Zionism with
settler colonialism, we turn to an elaboration of Zionism itself to demonstrate the incongruence
between the two concepts.
Zionism Versus Settler Colonialism
First and foremost, Zionism was indeed (re)colonialist to the extent that it was a
movement of primarily—but not exclusively—Jews of European extraction to Palestine. The
intent was to settle the land and encourage Jewish newcomers to compete for land and labor with
both the Palestinian Arab residents and Arab economic migrants beginning in the 1880s and
continuing onward until the 1947 partition of Palestine (and beyond) (Bareli, 2001). During this
period, both Jews and Palestinian Arabs competed for recognition with the British imperial
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authorities, in what amounted to a “civil war” between two separate nationalistic communities
(Bareli, 2001).
Unlike “settler societies” elsewhere, Jews did not view themselves as foreign to the land,
but as Indigenous returnees seeking national independence (Troen, 2007). For this fundamental
reason, Palestine was chosen over alternative locations (Goff et al., 1998; Gans, 2007). While
certainly influenced by European thought, the Zionists invoked the cultural distinctness of the
Jewish People, a difference recognized by Europeans historically through the “othering” and
persecution of European Jews for centuries (Bareli, 2001).
Jews, according to Shimoni, were perceived as the “...quintessential Oriental Other”
(Shimoni, 2007, p. 860) in the myriad of societies they inhabited throughout history. Over time,
they had, to varying extents, internalized the ideals of their host societies, engaged in self-hatred
and the internalization of stereotypes, and desired to mimic dominant cultural norms (Shimoni,
2007). Zionism was perceived by many of its adherents as the way to assert a more confident
identity and (re)construct the “New Jew” through a re-association with the symbolism and
connection of the land of Eretz Yisrael/Palestine. This particularly involved the pursuit of Jewish
resilience, and self-sufficiency for the Jews that were undoubtedly influenced by European
thought, but nevertheless distinct from European nationalism (Shimoni, 2007).
For postcolonialist critiques of Zionism—irrespective of its positive and negative
consequences—the matter of Jewish indigeneity to the land is denied, ignored, or dismissed as
irrelevant. Such critiques consign Zionism to a political, historic, and socioeconomic vacuum, by
conflating Zionist (re)colonization with true cases of settler colonialism elsewhere, thereby
making Zionism appear as not only possessing a parasitic quality, but also an arbitrary and
predatory approach towards the Palestinian Arabs. Such arguments disenfranchise Jews, while
privileging Palestinian Arabs, of their Indigenous patrimony, while ignoring the “othering” that
has also transpired on the side of Arab nationalists in general, and Palestinian Arab nationalists,
in particular. Speaking to this trend in postcolonialist analysis of Zionism, Shimoni asserted that,
[…] nothing is said of the degradations deriving from the traditional dhimmi status of
Jews as a tolerated but subordinate and oft-humiliated religious minority within the realm
of Islam; not to speak of consequent self-righteous indignation at any expressions of
Jewish assertiveness, and the pathological shame-and-honour syndrome which precludes
any thought of Jewish sovereignty within any part whatsoever of the claimed geo19

political realm of Islam. Moreover, as unquestionably sound scholarship has shown, Arab
representations of Jews have increasingly projected unmistakably anti-Semitic motifs,
avidly adopted from Christian Europe. (Shimoni, 2007, p. 863)
However, as alluded to elsewhere, this is not to suggest that Eurocentricism did not exist
among many Zionists. Many did in fact believe that their way of life was superior to that of
Palestine’s Arab inhabitants, which was all but an inescapable legacy of the European
environment in which the early Zionists found themselves (Bareli, 2001). However, there were
those Zionists who valorized—often romanticizing and idealizing—“the Orient,” causing intraZionist discord over what manifestation Zionism should take on (Shimoni, 2007).
Among such Zionists were those who claimed that the Jews and Arabs were essentially
distant family, with some maintaining—albeit with scant evidence—that some Palestinian Arabs
were indeed descendants of ancient Hebrews, as a way to demonstrate their fealty to the land and
the region (Penslar, 2001). David Ben-Gurion himself made this assertion, which had the de
facto effect of linking Jewish indigenity to any claims made by the Palestinian Arab population,
and vice versa (Pearl, 2008). Others viewed the Palestinian Arabs as a corporate group (Muir,
2008) and called for social integration with Palestinian Arabs, and for Jews to learn Arabic in
their schools (Karsh, 2008), all the while recognizing that the land had enough room for both
national groups (Gans, 2007). It would seem then that among prominent Zionist thinkers—at
least rhetorically—there was no conflict in admitting that Jews were not Palestine’s sole
Indigenous inheritors.
According to Penslar, Zionism’s mission civilisatrice was directed primarily at other Jews,
with the aim of having the Jewish People shed off the yoke of Europe and transform themselves
economically and politically through the (re)invention of an Indigenous folk culture in their
historic homeland. There was no colonial attempt to force affiliation with Judaism or Zionist
ideals upon the Palestinian Arab population, unlike other European colonial projects in North
America, Africa, and Asia (Penslar, 2001). The “New Jew” was to use Hebrew as a living
national language—a language always Indigenous to the region, most palpably in Eretz
Yisrael/Palestine (Bareli, 2001)—in direct opposition to those who sought other languages as the
Jewish lingua franca (Troen, 2007).
Importantly, Zionists invested capital in, rather than extracting resources from, Palestine
for the benefit of a colonial metropole, demonstrating that Jewish (re)colonization was not
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carried out for economic or merely “Eurocentric” purposes. In fact, local economic conditions
became attractive (for all) only following the considerable influx of Jewish capital to Palestine
from abroad (Bareli, 2001).
Ultimately, however, the conflict was that of two competing nationalisms. Both the
Zionists and the Palestinian Arabs sought to curry favour with the British imperial powers, and
argue their respective positions. The majority of mainstream Zionists indeed sought to peacefully
(to the extent possible) establish a Jewish majority in Palestine, all while recognizing that there
would always be—and rightfully so—a permanent Arab minority within a Jewish State (Karsh,
2008). Jewish indigeneity as a basis for Zionist aspirations did not preclude the same rights for
the Palestinian Arab population, despite the reverse being true by a significant proportion of the
Palestinian Arab community (Shimoni, 2007). In this respect, we see at the very least that the
opposition to Zionism in Palestine was not over its effect, but rather its intent. Moreover, today’s
postcolonial attempts at critiquing Zionism tend to critique both Zionism’s intent and effect, and
demonstrating the congruence between Zionism and settler colonialism, which is a far different
exercise than what informed the original reasoning by Palestinian Arabs themselves surrounding
their rejection of Zionism.
A further characteristic of postcolonial discourse on Zionism is the failure to
contextualize Zionism within its historical environment. The enterprise itself began in the late
19th century within the Ottoman Empire, and continued under British imperial rule following the
Ottoman surrender. In such a political environment, Jews had limited authority over their own
affairs, as imperial law determined the limits of the Zionist enterprise in all spheres of life
(Penslar, 2001). Moreover, unlike in other imperial contexts, Jews were not provided free lands
and indentured labour in service of a foreign imperial enterprise, but instead had to purchase land
and hire labor through their own means (Golan, 2001). However, as reiterated elsewhere,
investment in Palestine was the norm, rather than the reverse, as Troen (2007) clearly illustrated:
Jewish colonization during its first forty years took place in the Ottoman Empire and was
not part of the process of imperial expansion in search of power and markets. It was not a
consequence of industrialization and financial interests. Indeed, as numerous scholars
have noted, Jewish settlement was so unprofitable that it has been judged to be
economically irrational. (Troen, 2007, p. 881; italic emphasis added)
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This meant that Zionist (re)colonization of Palestine required the buttressing of Jewish
self-sufficiency in agriculture and commerce, to augment a unique societal foundation for further
growth. At times, although certainly not always, this process resulted in exclusionary policies in
relation to Arab labor, whereby Arabs lost employment prospects as Zionists encouraged and
pressured Jewish employers to hire only Jewish employees (Cohen, 2011). Yet the behavior was
carried out to ensure Jewish self-sufficiency without any imperial aegis (Shimoni, 2007). That is,
Zionism was meant to produce Jewish national continuity, self-sufficiency, and independence
within Eretz Yisrael/Palestine, alone, with no loyalty to any other country. As Shimoni put it,
“those postcolonialist studies which ignore this intrinsic truth are guilty of the...privileging of
consequences over intentions” (Shimoni, 2007, p. 866).
It is possible, however, to conceive of Zionism as being simultaneously an Indigenous
project of Jewish national reconstitution in Eretz Yisrael/Palestine and a settler colonial
enterprise, insofar as people point to the effect of Zionism rather than its intent (as mentioned
above). Through this perspective, analysts could point out particular Israeli policies which are
detrimental to Palestinian national interests, rights, needs, and desires. However, such critiques
would merit appropriate consideration in the context of a critique of Israeli policies, along the
lines of critique levied against any other country—no more and no less. Zionism itself could not
be considered the fulcrum upon which any and all social ills evident within the IsraeliPalestinian conflict hinge. There are myriad reasons for the state of affairs that contemporarily
plague Israelis and Palestinians. Thus, it is necessary to reiterate that Jewish indigeneity and
subsequent self-determination is not in question, just as Palestinian national rights are not in
question. However, individual Israeli and Palestinian policies can certainly be questioned,
without drawing inaccurate parallels to settler colonialism, or extinguishing the rights of any one
group.
Conclusion
Zionism is an unprecedented form of (re)colonization, as it is the only historical instance
in which an Indigenous People have returned to their homeland through a deliberate effort to
reacquaint themselves with their patrimony, revive their language, and re-establish their society
(Bareli, 2001). No other colonial venture can claim an Indigenous connection to the land which it
colonizes, setting Zionism apart from archetypical settler colonial undertakings. Efforts to de-
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indigenize the Jewish People and equate Zionism as a wholly settler colonial project in the
pejorative sense fail to make a convincing case, given this historical connection.
Moreover, the available PACS literature makes it clear that the denial of Jewish
Indigenous identity is more likely to exacerbate an already intractable conflict rather than foster
fruitful reconciliation efforts between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Arabs. That being said, the
legacy of British (and Ottoman) imperialism in contemporary Israel/Palestine is both a blessing
and a curse depending on one’s position within the forces of history. Two nations with
different—yet valid—claims to the same land continue to struggle over recognition, territory,
and self-determination.
This discussion sought not to explore the many (in)justices of this conflict for both
communities, or offer any (il)legitimate prescriptions for contemporary peace or redress. Rather,
the narrative sought to demonstrate the futility in suggesting that Palestinian Arabs enjoy sole
claims to indigeneity in the land, at the expense of the Jewish People, and the subsequent
synonymization of Zionism with settler colonialism, based on this very premise. Despite the
complexity and emotions involved in this iconic conflict, it is apparent that by any measure in
which Palestinian Arabs can express legitimate indigeneity to the land, so too can the Jewish
People.
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